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Abstract The symmetrization postulates of quantum mechanics (symmetry for
bosons, antisymmetry for fermions) are usually taken to entail that quantum parti-
cles of the same kind (e.g., electrons) are all in exactly the same state and therefore
indistinguishable in the strongest possible sense. These symmetrization postulates
possess a general validity that survives the classical limit, and the conclusion
seems therefore unavoidable that even classical particles of the same kind must
all be in the same state—in clear conflict with what we know about classical parti-
cles. In this article we analyze the origin of this paradox. We shall argue that in the
classical limit classical particles emerge, as new entities that do not correspond to
the “particle indices” defined in quantum mechanics. Put differently, we show that
the quantum mechanical symmetrization postulates do not pertain to particles, as
we know them from classical physics, but rather to indices that have a merely for-
mal significance. This conclusion raises the question of whether the discussions
about the status of identical quantum particles have not been misguided from the
very start.
Keywords identical quantum particles · indistinguishability · classical particles ·
emergence · classical limit of quantum mechanics
PACS 03.65+b
1 Introduction
In classical physics, particles are the example par excellence of distinguishable
individuals. No two classical particles can be in exactly the same physical state: in
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2Newtonian spacetime different particles will at least occupy different spatial po-
sitions at any moment, because of their impenetrability. They will therefore obey
Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, which says that different in-
dividuals cannot share all their physical properties. Moreover, classical particles
possess genidentity, i.e. identity over time. That is, given two particle configura-
tions at different instants, it is an objective physical fact for each particle at the
later instant with which particle in the earlier configuration it corresponds. This
is because classical particles follow definite trajectories that make it possible to
follow them over time. Classical particles can thus always be distinguished and
be given individual names, or numbers: particle 1, particle 2, etc. These particle
numbers are correlated with different and therefore identifying physical charac-
teristics.
In quantum theory the status of individual objects is a notoriously more com-
plicated subject. The standard quantum mechanical treatment of particles starts
simply enough, with the uncontroversial case of one particle described in a single
Hilbert space. In the case of two or more particles the tensor product of such indi-
vidual Hilbert spaces is formed,H1
⊗
H2
⊗
H3
⊗
.... The natural interpretation,
especially with the classical case in mind, is that in such formulasHi is the Hilbert
space of particle i (i.e., the possible states of particle i correspond to density op-
erators defined onHi). In other words, it seems natural to interpret the indices as
not only referring to the individual factor spaces in the total tensor product Hilbert
space, but also to individual particles.
Complications arise for particles of the same kind (so-called “identical parti-
cles”). The elementary identical quantum particles we know are either bosons or
fermions, whose states—defined inH1
⊗
H2
⊗
H3
⊗
...
⊗
Hn—are completely
symmetrical or antisymmetrical, respectively1. In such (anti)symmetrical states
the restriction of the state to a single factor space (i.e., the density operator ob-
tained by “partial tracing” over the variables of the other factor spaces) is the
same for all factor spaces. All one-particle states defined in the individual Hilbert
spacesHi are therefore equal. If the indices i are regarded as particle indices, this
means that the several particles cannot be individuated on the basis of their state-
dependent properties (like position, momentum, etc.)2. Since the state-independent
properties (charge, rest mass, etc.) are by definition equal for “identical particles”,
this leads to the conclusion that all particles of the same kind possess exactly the
same physical properties. Their individuality can therefore not be based on indi-
viduating physical properties, and Leibniz’s Principle (at least the form of it that
says that different individuals must differ in at least one of their properties) is
apparently violated.
1 We only consider bosons and fermions here, and do not discuss the possibility of paraparti-
cles and parastatistics. However, consideration of paraparticles would not affect the argument of
this article.
2 Here we follow standard interpretational ideas, according to which the states we just men-
tioned provide complete physical descriptions. If, on the other hand, it is assumed that a finer
description is possible, and that the quantum state only provides statistical information about the
actual properties of physical systems—like in Bohm’s theory or in modal interpretations—there
may very well exist individuating physical characteristics. The whole issue is therefore interpre-
tation dependent; our discussion here stays within the same standard interpretational framework
adopted by most recent discussions about the individuality of identical particles.
3This strange situation is the origin of an extensive literature about the nature
of identical quantum particles. The present situation seems to be this: If we do
not want the individuality of identical particles to be a fundamental property it-
self (“haecceity”, “fundamental thisness”), there may be the option of weakening
Leibniz’s principle by introducing a a weak form of discernibility, based on the
existence of irreflexive relations between the particles (see [5,15,2] for general
discussion, [9,10,12–14] for elaboration of the just-mentioned position, [3,4] for
criticism).
It is important to note that the symmetrization postulates, which are responsi-
ble for the equality of all one-particle states, are basic postulates of quantum me-
chanics that apply to the collection of all particles of the same kind. This means,
for example, that all electrons in the universe are in exactly the same state, what-
ever the differences between the physical conditions at different positions in the
universe. In particular, it does not make sense to distinguish between electrons
here and electrons elsewhere, for instance in another solar system: all electrons in
the universe are localized in exactly the same way (“spread out over all electron
positions”, see below for more on this). It is not relevant for this universal appli-
cability of the symmetry postulates what kinds of interactions and situations are
considered; consequently, whatever circumstances may turn out to be important
for the transition to the classical limit, these do not affect the applicability of the
symmetrization postulates. This implies that even in the classical limit the differ-
ent particle indices i are all associated with exactly the same state. In other words,
it seems that even classical particles must be completely indistinguishable!
This result is obviously problematic—in fact, we began our whole argument by
pointing out that classical particles are distinguishable objects par excellence. So
something must have gone wrong in the above reasoning. In the remainder of this
article we shall analyze the source of this paradox, and investigate the implications
of our analysis for the particle concept in quantum mechanics.
2 The states of identical particles
Consider the concrete case of a system consisting of two electrons3. Electrons are
fermions and therefore have an antisymmetrical state, typically looking like
|Ψ〉= 1√
2
(|φ〉1|ψ〉2−|ψ〉1|φ〉2). (1)
Here, the subscripts 1 and 2 indicate whether the indexed state is defined in H1
or in H2, respectively. Taking partial traces, we find that both the state restricted
toH1 and the state restricted toH2 has the form W = 12 (|φ〉〈φ |+ |ψ〉〈ψ|). If we
think of H1 and H2 as the state space of particle 1 and particle 2, respectively,
we can thus conclude that both particles are in exactly the same state: figuratively
speaking, they are both half in |φ〉 and half in |ψ〉.
3 As just explained, we should in principle always consider the fully entangled state of all
electrons in the universe and, in view of the equality of all partial traces, considering a two-
electrons subsystem with specific properties does not really makes sense then. So at the moment
it is best to think of a universe in which there exist only two electrons. In sections 3 and 4 we
shall work out a particle concept for which it does make sense to consider specific subsystems.
4This means that it would not be correct to say that |Ψ〉 describes one particle
in |φ〉 and one in |ψ〉. In fact, a state with particle 1 in |φ〉 and particle 2 in |ψ〉
necessarily would have to possess the product form |φ〉1⊗|ψ〉2 [16, sect. VI.2],
which not only conflicts with the symmetrization postulate but is also empirically
different from (1). The expectation value of an observable A of the two-electron
system (a symmetrical hermitean operator4 in state (1), 〈Ψ |A |Ψ〉, differs from
its expectation value in a product state by the presence of an interference term
〈φ1⊗ψ2|A |ψ1⊗φ2〉. It may happen, of course, that this cross term vanishes for
particular choices of A, and in this case use of the product state does not lead us
into conflict with empirical results. But then there always are other observables for
which the cross terms do not vanish, and empirical evidence confirms the existence
of these terms. This means that the suspension of the symmetrization postulates
that sometimes occurs in the physics literature, for instance when spatially isolated
systems are subjected to position measurements, is only pragmatically justified.
This manoeuvre simplifies the calculations, but has no fundamental status. The
fully symmetrized entangled state has general applicability and validity, and is
therefore the only one to be used in a general analysis.
The conclusion is thus unavoidable that different “particle indices” i, j can-
not be associated with any measurable physical differences. Among philosophers
of physics this is an acknowledged fact that has given rise to the hotly debated
question of what then is able to ground the individuality of these particles.
But it should be noted that in those parts of the foundational literature that do
not focus on identity issues, and in the actual practice of physics, the use of the par-
ticle concept is not unequivocal. It is true that particles are sometimes associated
with the indices of our above discussion; but one also encounters another, very
different use of the particle concept (cf. [6,7], where a distinction is introduced
between “h particles” and “q particles”). This alternative approach is significant
for our later analysis, and we therefore want to illustrate it by an example, namely
the notorious Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen case.
In its modern version, the EPR experiment refers to two electrons “at a distance
from each other”, on which spin measurements are performed. The two-particle
spin state on which attention usually focusses is the singlet state, but the full state
obviously also contains a spatial part. A correctly symmetrized total state is
|Φ〉= 1√
2
(|φ〉1|ψ〉2+ |ψ〉1|φ〉2)(|↑〉1| ↓〉2−|↓〉1| ↑〉2), (2)
where |↑〉 and |↓〉 stand for spin eigenstates with spin directed upwards and down-
wards in a particular direction, respectively, and where (|φ〉 and |ψ〉 now refer to
states that are localized “on the left hand side” and “the right hand side”, respec-
tively5. In the language of wave mechanics, |φ〉 and |ψ〉 represent localized wave
packets at a macroscopic distance from each other.
4 All observables of an identical particle system have to be symmetrical, among other things
in order to preserve the symmetry properties of the states over time. This has to be imposed in
addition to and independently of the (anti)symmetrization of the states.
5 In the state 2 there is no correlation between positions and spins. An alternative state, in
which there is such a correlation, is |Φ〉= 1√
2
(|φ〉1|ψ〉2|↑〉1| ↓〉2−|ψ〉1|φ〉2|↓〉1| ↑〉2). Consid-
eration of this alternative state leads to the same conclusion as the discussion in the main text:
the indices 1, 2 do not refer to localized particles.
5In the literature on EPR the state is often given in a different form, namely
|Φ ′〉= 1√
2
|φ〉1|ψ〉2(|↑〉1| ↓〉2−|↓〉1| ↑〉2), (3)
in which the spatial part is a simple product state. Clearly, this state does not
obey the anti-symmetrization postulate, and from a fundamental point of view it
therefore cannot be right. It is true that as long as we only consider observables that
commute with position, we shall not arrive at any wrong empirical predictions,
and this yields a pragmatic justification for using (3). But the really important
advantage of using Eq. (3) instead of the correct state is that this form of the state
lends itself to an easy interpretation: we have one particle at the left hand side,
and one on the right hand side. This fits in with the standard way of speaking
about EPR. According to the usual discussions there is a left-side particle L and a
right-side particle R, and we are interested in the results of spin measurements on
these two individual particles. Note that in this common way of dealing with the
situation the particles are treated as individuals that differ from each other in their
physical properties, namely their locations.
But if we use the correct form (2), and associate our particles, in accordance
with the official doctrine, with the “particle indices” 1 and 2, we have to conclude
that there is no left and no right particle: the states of both 1 and 2 are “evenly
distributed” between left and right. This means that the way the EPR case is usu-
ally understood, as being about a particle L and a particle R, is at variance with the
official doctrine regarding the concept of particles in quantum mechanics.
Of course, those who think in terms of individual localized particles in this
case (i.e., in practice almost everyone) generally know that the state in principle
has a form like (2); but this does not induce them to abandon the idea of an individ-
ual L and an individual R particle. This points into the direction of the existence of
an alternative way of handling the particle concept, one that does not relate parti-
cles to the indices in the tensor product formalism. Apparently, such an alternative
conception is already present in the practice of physics—at least on an intuitive
level. As we shall see, if worked out this other way of interpreting the particle
concept, rather than the official doctrine that indices represent particles, provides
a natural bridge to particles as they occur in classical physics.
3 Classical particles in quantum mechanics
Classical particles are characterized by their unique spatial positions and trajecto-
ries. It is often said that both these features are excluded in quantum mechanics;
and that therefore in quantum mechanics it cannot be an objective fact which parti-
cle at a later instant is identical with which earlier particle. According to this argu-
ment the concept of genidentity does not apply to quantum particles. However, if
this absence of particle localization and particle trajectories were a matter of prin-
ciple, the resulting situation would be very puzzling. Surely, the classical particle
picture must be expected to emerge from quantum mechanics in some limiting
case, and one must therefore assume that the typical classical particle features can
be mimicked in quantum mechanics. In fact, that this is indeed the case is well
known, in spite of the declarations to the contrary that we have just mentioned.
6One key result in this connection is Ehrenfest’s theorem about the dynamics of
expectation values of observables.
In the case of a Hamiltonian H = p2/2m+V (r), with p the momentum, m
the particle mass and V (r) a potential field, we can introduce a force field F(r) =
−∇V (r), in terms of which Ehrenfest’s theorem takes the form
〈F(r)〉= m d
2
dt2
〈r〉. (4)
For certain specific potentials (free motion, i.e. F=0, or if V is a quadratic function
of r) we find that 〈F(r)〉 equals F(〈r〉), so that in these cases the mean value of r
exactly satisfies the classical law of motion F(〈r〉) =m d2dt2 〈r〉. In general this is not
so. But if the wave function is localized in a sufficiently small region of space, so
that the variation of the force field within that region is small, we can replace Eq.
(4) by the classical equation in a good approximation (which becomes better when
the state becomes more localized). From this it follows that well-localized single-
particle quantum states (localized in the sense that their associated wave packets
are very narrow) follow classical trajectories to a very good approximation.
Classical trajectories therefore do exist in quantum mechanics: they are real-
ized by (very) small wave packets. In the case of a Hamiltonian that is quadratic
in position—the harmonic oscillator being the prime example—such small wave
packets remain small over time: their widths merely oscillate. This case there-
fore furnishes an example of a quantum system that almost perfectly mimics the
behavior of a classical particle.
If the potential does not have this special form there will in general be dis-
persion, so wave packets will spread out. Classical motion will then only be a
good description of the behavior of the average position of the wave packet dur-
ing a finite time, during which the approximation 〈F(r)〉= F(〈r〉) remains valid.
Moreover, even if the center of the wave packet stays on a classical trajectory, the
analogy with a classical particle path will get partially lost if the packet becomes
too extended. Free motion furnishes one example: although in this case the av-
erage position of a moving wave packet will always be exactly on the classical
trajectory, the width of the packet will increase in an approximately linear way,
according to 4r = {(4r0)2 +(4p0t/m)2}1/2 (with t representing time). When
the size of the packet has become substantial, results of consecutive position mea-
surements will no longer need to lie on a classical path, not even approximately. A
classical particle picture then does not apply. Consequently, we need a mechanism
to keep wave packets narrow in order to maintain classical particle-like structures
in quantum mechanics over longer stretches of time.
Such considerations are standard in studies on the classical limit of quantum
mechanics, and there is growing agreement that the essential element in explaining
how classical mechanics emerges from quantum mechanics is the process of de-
coherence. The key ideas are that physical systems are usually not isolated but in-
teract with an environment; and that in many circumstances the interaction is such
that the environment effectively performs (approximate) position measurements
on the systems in question. The effect of this interaction with the environment is
the destruction of coherence between parts of the wavefunction centered around
different positions: these parts become correlated with mutually orthogonal envi-
ronment states. Spatially extended wave functions are transformed into mixtures
7of spatially very narrow states. Model calculations indicate that these narrow wave
functions obey the quantum mechanical evolution equation governed by the sys-
tem’s own Hamiltonian (leading, among other things, to the validity of Ehrenfest’s
theorem commented upon above) plus two terms representing the interaction with
the environment (see [17], especially equations 17 and 24 therein). The first of
these terms is a damping term, representing friction with the environment; the
second term, more important for our purposes, represents the decoherence pro-
cess and keeps on minimizing the dimensions of the wave packet.
As a result, the classical limit of quantum mechanics is characterized by the
emergence of classical particle trajectories that are followed by narrow wave pack-
ets. These narrow, localized wave packets become the particles we are familiar
with in classical physics. Collections of such localized wave packets represent the
particle subsystems we are used to refer to (compare footnote 2 in section 2).
4 The particle concept in quantum mechanics
The finer details of the decoherence mechanism, and the work that remains to be
done to fully understand them, need not detain us here. The important thing is
that there is a consensus that classical particles emerge from quantum mechanics
as narrow wave packets that in very good approximation follow classical particle
paths. This is the conceptual background of what we have signalled before: in the
practice of physics the particle concept is very often not linked to the indices in
the formalism, but rather to distinct localized states. The EPR experiment, where
the localized states on the left and right wing of the experiment are associated with
an individual L and R particle, respectively, is but one example of this. The way
we usually speak about experiments (the positrons in the CERN experiment, etc.)
or about the objects surrounding us (the quantum particles making up this table)
are other examples.
Thinking about quantum particles in this way is eminently reasonable. The
origin of the concept “particle” comes from classical physics, and in this classical
context we know exactly what we are talking about when we use the term. Our
language is permeated by concepts referring to localized objects and particles.
Given this background, it seems only natural to reserve the same term in quantum
mechanics for things that share core characteristics with classical particles and
that become recognizable as classical particles in the classical limit. This bill is
fitted by localized states, but not by the states associated with “particle indices”.
To see the difference between the two rival quantum particle concepts clearly,
consider the state
1√
2
(|φ〉1|ψ〉2+ |ψ〉1|φ〉2), (5)
in which the one-particle states |φ〉 and |ψ〉 are localized. It could be that they
have always been this way, and that the dynamics preserves the localization (as
in the harmonic oscillator case), but the more typical situation is that decoherence
processes are responsible for the appearance of this localized two-particle state in
a incoherent mixture of similar states. Now, according to the way of handling the
particle concept that we have just explained, the state (5) represents two individ-
ual and distinguishable particles, one at the position where |φ〉 is localized and
8the other at the position defined by |ψ〉. By contrast, if we hold fast to the idea
that particles are represented by the indices occurring in the formalism, we arrive
at the conclusion that (5) represents a situation in which there are two indistin-
guishable “particles”, both in the state 12 (|φ〉〈φ |+ |ψ〉〈ψ |). As we have mentioned
before, this indistinguishability survives the classical limit: since all factor Hilbert
spaces and the states defined in them occur completely symmetrically in the total
state, all interactions will affect the states in the factor spaces in exactly the same
way. So all indices will remain associated with the same density operator, evenly
distributed over the pure one-particle states. The “index-particles” therefore do
not become classical particles in this limit: they refuse to become localized. This
seems a reductio of the idea that the Hilbert space indices can be taken to stand
for particles.
5 Emergence of particles in quantum mechanics
Our proposal is therefore to think of particles in quantum mechanics as repre-
sented by localized wave packets. That is to say, if we encounter a state |Ψ〉 de-
fined inH1
⊗
H2
⊗
H3
⊗
...
⊗
Hn, and wish to investigate whether it can be in-
terpreted in terms of particles, we have to ask ourselves whether it can be written
as a symmetrized product of localized one-particle states. A worry that might arise
here is whether such a decomposition of |Ψ〉, if it exists, is unique. If more than
one particle-like representations of |Ψ〉 could be found, the uniqueness of the clas-
sical limit and the meaningfulness itself of our particle concept would be endan-
gered. At first sight this worry seems certainly serious, because the symmetrization
postulates require that the coefficients appearing in front of the product terms in
the symmetrized state |Ψ〉 are all equal. For example, in state (5) both terms are
prefixed by 1√
2
, which means that we are dealing with a degenerate Schmidt (bi-
orthogonal) decomposition. In such a case there are infinitely many other Schmidt
decompositions: each rotation in the subspaces ofH1 andH2 spanned by |φ〉 and
|ψ〉 leads to a new pair of vectors |φ ′〉, |ψ ′〉 in terms of which the bi-orthogonal
form (5) can be written down too. However, and this is crucial, these alternative
decompositions will not be in terms of localized wave packets. Indeed, rotations
in Hilbert space are implemented by unitary transformations that transform the
original vectors into linear combinations of them; if the original states are local-
ized in connected regions of space the transformed stated, being superpositions of
the original ones, are obviously not thus localized. It follows that if a decompo-
sition of state |Ψ〉 is possible in form (5) with localized states |φ〉 and |ψ〉, this
decomposition is unique. This argument generalizes immediately to the case of an
arbitrary number of particles.
The demand that a state represents particles, in the sense we have defined here,
is therefore much stronger than that the state can be written in the form (5) with
mutually orthogonal |φ〉 and |ψ〉. The latter is always possible, for any state in a
Hilbert space H1
⊗
H2 (because of Schmidt’s theorem). It is the added localiz-
ability condition that makes the question of whether there exists a decomposition
of the required form non-trivial, and makes the decomposition unique if it exists.
In most cases states will not allow a particle interpretation; think, for example,
of a state of the form (5) with two overlapping wave packets |φ〉 and |ψ〉 (each
9defined in a connected region of space). The bi-orthogonal decomposition that we
need, in terms of localized states that are non-overlapping (and therefore mutu-
ally orthogonal) clearly does not exist: there of course does exist a bi-orthogonal
decomposition, but the states occurring in it will be linear combinations of |φ〉
and |ψ〉 and will therefore overlap spatially. An arbitrarily chosen quantum state
will therefore not describe particles. We need special circumstances to make the
particle concept applicable. In this sense, the classical limit with its decoherence
processes makes classical particles really emerge from the substrate of the quan-
tum world.
It should be added that the circumstances that are responsible for the emer-
gence of classical particles also justify the use of the statistics that we expect for
the case of several independent individuals. The symmetrization postulates require
that “many-particle states” (in the sense of general states in a Hilbert space that is
the tensor product of more than one factor spaces) are entangled, and in general
this leads to the existence of correlations in measurement results, even if there
is no question of past or present mutual interactions. From our perspective, this
remarkable “quantum statistics” (either Fermi-Dirac or Bose-Einstein) points into
the direction of a failure of the individual particle concept in the general quantum
situation. The “particle alternative” is to see the existence of these correlations as
a sign that quantum particle states are subject to peculiar initial or boundary con-
ditions (see [5,15,2] for discussion), or that quantum particles exert “exchange
forces” on each other (repulsion between fermions and attraction between bosons,
see [8] for a critical discussion of this concept). In our approach complications of
this kind do not arise, since we reject the idea of particles in the general situation in
which we do not have localized systems. In the case of spatially non-overlapping
wave packets, in which the particles concept does become applicable, both Fermi-
Dirac and Bose-Einstein statistics reduce to the usual Boltzmannian statistics, as
is well known.
6 Classical particles and indices
In order to obtain a clearer view on the connection between particles as we have
defined them here, via localized wave packets, and the particle concept that relates
to the indices in the formalism, it may be helpful to compare with an analogy that
may be constructed in classical mechanics [6,7]. As it turns out, it is possible to
define classical “indistinguishable particles” that resemble the indistinguishable
“index-particles” in quantum mechanics6.
We do not ordinarily use symmetry postulates in classical mechanics, but in
the case of particles of the same kind we could introduce a symmetrization proce-
dure without changing the empirical content of the theory. In the usual formalism
the state of a system consisting of n particles of the same kind is represented by
one point in phase space, with the first coordinate standing for the position of par-
ticle 1, the second for the position of particle 2, the n+1-th coordinate represent-
ing the momentum of particle 1, etc. Obviously, it would not make any empirical
6 The formal structure of quantum mechanics is essentially different from that of classical me-
chanics, in particular because superpositions make no sense classically. The analogy presented
here can therefore only be partial.
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difference if we were to call particle 1 particle 2, etc. The only thing that is im-
portant is that there is one particle in state (x1, p1), one in (x2.p2), etc.; the states
individuate the particles and it is irrelevant how we number them. Permutation of
the names of the particles will not lead to any physical differences. With this in
mind, consider all permutations of the particle numbers, in which these are dis-
tributed differently over the one-particle states. This will generate n! phase points,
in which the individual one-particle states are numbered differently, correspond-
ing to the number (name) of the particle to which they pertain. These n! states are
all empirically indistinguishable from each other and from the original state, the
only difference between them being the way the one-particle states are indexed,
i.e. on which phase space axes each particular one-particle state (x, p) is repre-
sented. Now, instead of the usual mechanical state, given by our single original
phase point, we might introduce a symmetrized state represented by the complete
collection of these n! points. This new state is symmetrical because it is invariant
under permutations of the indices. All the usual formulas from classical mechan-
ics can be reformulated to accommodate this new state definition: the idea simply
is to do the usual calculations for each point separately. For the case of dynami-
cal evolution this will lead to a new n!-points state, again symmetrical and with
all points empirically equivalent; and in general, the calculations will lead to n!
results that only differ from each other in their assignments of indices. The final
result can then be taken as the collection of these n! partial results.
Evidently, the sole purpose of this manoeuver is to make it manifest that noth-
ing physical depends on the numbering of the particles. The particles are physi-
cally characterized by the individual states (x, p), not by the indices. But now sup-
pose that, in spite of this symmetrization, we are caught in the idea that each index
has to correspond to a specific particle, and that we are going to inquire about the
state of particle i. In our symmetrized scheme, the natural answer consists in the
collection of (x, p) states that bear the index i, given the n! phase points that make
up the many-particle state. In this way all one-particle states are attributed to each
index value. The conclusion would then be that the particles are all in exactly the
same state and therefore indistinguishable.
It goes without saying that the latter conclusion is in conflict with the way
the particle concept is actually used in classical mechanics. In classical mechanics
particles are as distinguishable as their states (x, p) are; and from this point of
view the above argument is simply a confused misinterpretation of the indices.
The indices were only formal expedients, but the argument took them to denote
individual physical objects. The resulting indistinguishability paradox is dispelled
once we realize what role the indices really play.
This mistaken piece of classical arguing is, however, analogous to the standard
reasoning we find in quantum mechanics: instead of looking for individuating
physical particle characteristics that might make it possible to speak of individual,
distinguishable entities, one holds fast to the a priori idea that the Hilbert space
indices should play this role. The symmetry of the formalism should give one
pause: instead of indicating that all particles are in the same state, this symmetry
signals that the indices do not have the role of particle names.
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7 Weak discernibility
In the foregoing sections we have focused on the classical limit of quantum me-
chanics, with the aim of showing that the indices in the tensor product formalism
do not become classical particle names in this limit. This leaves it open, however,
that the indices refer to individual objects of a different kind, genuine quantum
particles, say, that remain distinct from the classical particles that emerge in the
classical limit. There is indeed a growing literature in which it is claimed that
the indices in the tensor product formalism do refer to such individual physical
entities, distinct from each other by virtue of their physical characteristics. This
is clearly a claim that has to be investigated. Associating each index with its own
haecceity in order to guarantee that it corresponds to an individual object is a move
that needs not be taken very seriously, as it boils down to attributing individuality
by fiat; but if it is true that there are physical features that discern the indices, the
conclusion that they are denoting individual quantum objects becomes harder to
resist.
We have already seen that all indices are associated with exactly the same re-
duced state; this seems to make the existence of individuating physical properties
impossible from the outset. However, there is a way out on which the approach
we just alluded to is based. The core idea is in the observation that even within the
scope of classical physics situations are thinkable in which entities are in identical
states but are nevertheless distinct individuals, namely situations with complete
symmetry. A famous example was introduced by Max Black [1]: consider two
spheres of exactly the same form and material constitution, alone in a relational
space (in order to exclude absolute position as a distinguishing property), at a fixed
distance from each other. This is a situation that seems certainly thinkable without
getting into contradictions. But it is also a situation in which no physical features
are able to distinguish between the two spheres, in spite of the fact that there are
obviously two of them. The spheres thus seem to defy Leibniz’s Principle, and
appear to possess an identity that cannot be grounded in physical differences.
However, there is a way to save a form of Leibniz’s Principle in such sym-
metrical classical configurations. As pointed out by Saunders [12,13], who takes
his cue from Quine [11], irreflexive relations are instantiated here: relations en-
tities cannot bear to themselves. In the case of the spheres, each sphere has a
non-vanishing distance to one other sphere; and an object cannot possess such a
distance to itself. This irreflexivity is the key to proving that (a generalized version
of) Leibniz’s Principle is satisfied after all. If an entity stands in a relation that it
cannot have to itself, there must be at least two entities. It is not difficult to formal-
ize this argument and to prove that the existence of irreflexive physical relations
grounds the multiplicity of objects, without recourse to haecceities. Because of
the sameness of all individual states it still is impossible to give names based on
physical characteristics in such cases; for example, we cannot give a description
of one of our spheres that would not apply equally to the other one. The objects are
therefore not distinguishable in the usual sense; but still we can prove that there
are more than one of them. For this reason the term “weak discernibility” has been
introduced to capture how objects differ from each other in such situations.
The idea now is that in quantum mechanics the situation is analogous. That
is, although the states associated with different indices are identical, irreflexive
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relations exist between the indices that make them weakly discernible. In the case
of fermions the total state is antisymmetric, like in Eq. (1), and here the irreflex-
ive relation takes the form of “being associated with different one-particle states”.
Indeed, as can be verified in Eq. (1), in the antisymmetric case each term of the su-
perposition contains indices that indicate different vectors in Hilbert space. From
this Saunders [12,13,9] concludes that fermions are physical individuals, albeit
only weakly discernible ones. Muller and Seevinck extend this argument to bosons
[10]. They observe that quite generally there exist irreflexive relations between the
indices: operators that belong to different Hilbert spaces, indexed by different in-
dices, always commute, whereas this is not the case for operators belonging to the
same Hilbert space. In particular, momentum and position operators with differ-
ent indices commute, whereas they do not if their indices are the same. So even
bosons appear to be weakly discernible individuals.
It should be noted, however, that these arguments hinge on a silent premiss,
namely that the indices not only play a mathematical role but also possess phys-
ical significance. As mathematical demonstrations, demonstrating the individual-
ity of the different factor spaces, they are unproblematic; but we need an addi-
tional justification for thinking that the indices also correlate to something phys-
ical. Of course, it is simple enough to find irreflexive relations between numbers,
for instance the relation of inequality. It is also easy to couch such relations in a
language that suggests reference to physical quantities, for instance by speaking
about observables that belong to the same or different Hilbert spaces. But that
will not suffice. We need a positive indication that the different Hilbert space,
and the operators (“observables”) defined in them, refer to elements of the phys-
ical world—certainly not all mathematical quantities occurring within a physical
theory refer to things existing physically. In our case, whether the Hilbert space
indices and the mathematical quantities labelled by them possess physical signif-
icance is precisely the issue under discussion, and it would therefore be question
begging to assume this significance. We need an argument to make the indices
physically respectable. To get a clue about possible criteria here, let us first have
a look at classical physics.
In situations in classical physics without particular symmetries, physical rela-
tions can be used to distinguish and name the things that are related. For example,
in an arbitrary configuration of more than two classical particles the distances with
respect to the other particles will unambiguously characterize each individual par-
ticle, and in this way we obtain clear evidence that the relata in distance relations
are separate physical objects. In other words, distance relations are the kind of re-
lations that connect physical things. Changing the configuration so that it becomes
more symmetrical (but not yet completely symmetrical) will change the values of
the distances, but not the number or nature of the objects themselves. This possi-
bility of distinguishing and naming actual objects in asymmetrical situations thus
provides us with a justification for thinking that if distance relations apply, it is
physical things to which they apply. The completely symmetrical situation is a
degenerate situation, a limiting case, in which naming via distances admittedly
becomes impossible but in which the distance relations are still sufficient to estab-
lish weak discernibility and are able to fix the number of objects.
Indeed, why are we so sure intuitively that there are two Blackean spheres?
This is because our mind’s eye sees these spheres at different distances or in dif-
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ferent directions before us; in thought we break the symmetry, which makes it
possible to distinguish the entities and name them (the left and right sphere, for
example). The symmetrical configuration is thus thought of as a limiting case of
the more familiar asymmetrical situation.
Now compare the quantum case. Can a similar story be told here, to make it ac-
ceptable that the indices are potential particle labels? Unfortunately, this attempt is
immediately thwarted by the symmetrization postulates. It is a fundamental prin-
ciple of quantum theory that the indices can never appear in configurations that are
not symmetrical. In classical physics perfect symmetry of particle configurations,
if it occurs at all, is something contingent; but in quantum mechanics it is a law-
like feature that all indices must always occur, in any expression and in whatever
situation, in a fully symmetrical way. It is even useless to introduce an external
standard: if in thought we inject ourselves into the world of electrons, quantum
theory requires that all relations between us and the electrons remain completely
symmetrical in the indices. This is very much different from the case of Black’s
spheres. In quantum mechanics it is a matter of principle that we can never asso-
ciate different physical characteristics with different indices in the formalism. We
therefore lack evidence that the indices may refer to distinct physical entities at all
(see for more on this [3,4]), and the irreflexive relations in which the indices stand
can not be assumed to connect physical entities.
But what about our actual experience, telling us that in many experiments we
do encounter individual electrons and other particles? This we have discussed in
the previous sections: such experiments, to the extent that they provide convincing
evidence about the presence of particles, pertain to classical limiting situations. As
we have seen, the particles that emerge in those situations do not correspond to the
indices in the quantum formalism.
8 Conclusion
We conclude that the indices in the quantum mechanical formalism of “identical
particles” refer to the individual factor spaces from which the total Hilbert space
in the formalism is constructed—they are merely mathematical quantities.
In order to support this conclusion we have first argued that, within a standard
no-hidden-variables interpretational context, the classical limit does not associate
Hilbert space indices with particles as we know them from pre-quantum physics.
Well-localized wave packets do take on this role: they do represent classical par-
ticles in the limiting situation. The appearance of particles in quantum mechanics
is therefore a case of emergence. Only if specific physical conditions are satis-
fied, resulting in the presence of localized wave packets (decoherence processes
are usually essential here) does the concept of a particle in the ordinary sense be-
come applicable to the world described by quantum mechanics. These emerging
particles are not linked to the indices occurring in the formalism.
Second, we have argued more generally that in the standard interpretation there
is no indication that the indices in the formalism denote distinct physical entities
at all. Rather, the symmetrization postulates have the effect of eliminating any
potential physical label-like role of the indices. The analogy between quantum
mechanical systems of “identical particles” and classical collections of symmet-
rically positioned weakly discernible objects is only superficial. There is no sign
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within standard quantum mechanics that “identical particles”, denoted by indices,
are physical objects at all.
This conclusion raises the question of whether the discussions in the philoso-
phy of physics about the nature of the individuality of identical quantum particles
have not been misguided. It makes little sense to wonder whether Leibniz’s Princi-
ple is satisfied by identical quantum particles, or whether they possess haecceities,
if the existence itself of these particles has not been established.
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